Mary Brinton: Gender Equity and Low Fertility in Postindustrial Societies || Radcliffe Institute



so dude he introduced my project and I am first going to show a wonderful poster that one of my research partners did so those of you who came to the dinner last night saw this poster along with the other ones that were displayed so this is g1 Kim's poster about my project and if I gave you time to read it you wouldn't need to listen to my talk because she's got everything in here about my project including the names of my other research partners Teresa you and Gillian Mesa Pina Arturo Nava and Diana M and I have more research assistants who I'm lucky to have hired through the Weatherhead Center for International Affairs here at Harvard and they are nelly de Garcia Veronica Gloria soy Kim and Taeyang Kim now I noticed last night at the research partners dinner that a lot of us are using foreign languages in our projects so one of the reasons I am – and one of the reasons I have so many research assistants is all of these people all nine of them have one of two qualifications they're either bilingual in Spanish in English or bilingual in Korean in English and you'll see in a little while why that's so crucial for my project I'm also working with several graduate students here in my own department at Harvard Juliette Jo and SIL Oh Kristen Perkins and others and my project is a collaborative one across several countries and the piece of my project that I'm not going to talk very much about is the Swedish piece today I can answer some questions about it but the Swedish piece is being managed by my Swedish collaborator at Stockholm University so I'll be talking more about the other four countries in our project so a lot of us or some of us anyway in the room are old enough to remember Paul Ehrlich's sort of crisis call in 1968 about the Population Bomb and how the world population was going to explode and we would have famine and you know wide scale large-scale deprivation and so forth even in the 1970s and 1980s well that didn't happen we do have global warming and we have plenty of people living on the planet but there's another problem too which is the problem that I'm dealing with in this project which is what demographer is called the demographic time bomb which is almost the opposite problem what is this this is the fact that by the 1980s there were a number of countries in the post-industrial world who that had very very low fertility and I'm going to explain how this is calculated in just a moment but what's called lowest low fertility by demographers means that on average women in whatever particular country have 1.3 children or fewer and this is really historically unprecedented and it was completely unexpected by demographers generally societies experienced very low birth rates when there are major Wars and a lot of the male population may be out of the country or being decimated or when there are conditions of famine but otherwise we just haven't seen birth rates this low really in human history all of recorded human history so it was a really shocking realization that this was happening so let me define what fertility is sometimes when I start talking about this project people say oh you mean you know women are having trouble getting pregnant you know in these certain countries no that's fecundity which I'm not going to talk about today because that's not the problem it's not it's not that there are certain countries where women are having trouble getting pregnant it's that people aren't having children so fertility really refers to the actual you know having of children not the biological capability to do so so the total fertility rate is kind of a shorthand number the demographers used and it's calculated in this way so we calculate the number of children that would be born to a woman if she were to reach the end of her reproductive lifespan which is say up to age 45 or so and the current fertility rates in the society are what she would be applied to her so an age specific fertility rates so it's it's just kind of you know a an average number of children that women have and for a population to naturally be replacing itself so irrespective of immigrants coming into the country a country or an area has to have a population a fertility rate of 2.1 why is that why is it not – it's because even in the most highly industrialized countries there's some infant and child mortality and so two point one is the figure that demographers used so again this would be you know if a population is internally reproducing itself without immigration so fecundity again I'm not going to talk about so let's look at some data so here I put the total fertility rate between 1970 and 2010 for a number of countries your favorite country might not be here and if it's not you can ask me about it later I realized I only put a couple of European countries here because I'm an Asia but in any case in 1970 you can see that there was quite a broad range of fertility rates so Korea for instance Korea was still very much an economically developing Society in 1970 large agricultural sector and Korea had a pretty high fertility rate four point five children per woman Japan's was already really low so that orange circle is Japan and look at Sweden sweetums was below – below – children per women in 1970 when we go over – when we fast forward to 2010 you can see that the range of fertility rates is much much smaller and this would be true if we included the rest of Europe as well in New Zealand and Australia and so forth so you see that the range is really very small between 1.2 or so and 1.9 so the 1.9 countries just to to sort of force foreshadow what I'm going to talk about our u.s. and Sweden so look what happened to Sweden over this time it had a lot of rocky kind of trajectory but ended up having basically replacement level fertility Sweden does not have a low fertility problem the United States does not have a low fertility problem either and what's really interesting about that Japan and Sweden comparison is again Japanese fertility was higher in 1970 than Sweden's and look at Japan now it's way down here and Sweden's is up there so a real gap opened up Japanese fertility just kept going down down down down down and that's happened no matter what the Japanese government has done policy wise as I'll explain here you see Spain which is another of the main countries of my five country study and Spanish fertility was pretty high in 1970 and now it's kind of obscured it's behind the Italy and Japan boxes but Spain is right there very low 1.4 and then the rest of East Asia was pretty high Singapore Hong Kong South Korea yeah in 1970 and they're all at the bottom now so all of East Asia has way way way below replacement fertility rates and much of Europe but in particular southern Europe southern Europe Eastern Europe and East Asia are the areas that have very low fertility now why is this a problem again globally speaking it's really not a problem right we don't need like high birth rates in every country of the world for sure it's a problem when you think from the nation's perspective the nation states perspective so the economists the magazine The Economist is loving to pick on Japan about this this is the why do we care questioned and what demographers are meaning when they talk about this population or demographic time bomb rather so The Economist two weeks ago The Incredible Shrinking country Japan Japan is shrinking it's already shrinking the population is declining and it's projected Japan's population is projected to decline by one-sixth of the current population by 2040 it's projected to decline by 20 million people in the next 26 years Japan is the most rapidly aging population in the world because life expectancy is wonderfully high in Japan but people are having babies so if we look at the population pyramid for Japan so a population pyramid shows the age structure of the population and in 1950 and it's men and men on this side and women on this side in 1950 you can see if a lot of the population was below age 20 and certainly the majority of people were below age 40 in Japan then you know recovered from the war and heard a very rapid economic growth period by 2005 this is what the population pyramid looked at looked like so here you have kind of the baby boom generation who's moved up and they're in their 50s almost 60 now and there's a little boomlet baby boom lit there so people who were born and are now in their 20s now look at 2055 so this is called a top-heavy population pyramid because there are a whole lot of people in their 70s and 80s and very few they're projected to be very few people in the workforce in the labor force so basically it's projected at current fertility rates that by 2050 five four out of ten Japanese people will be over age 65 now again why does this matter it matters because they're not going to be very many people paying into the pension system there are going to be huge healthcare costs because of this very large number of elderly people and many economists would argue that you need a young vibrant labor force to keep the economy going that it's important for innovation and so forth and certainly the population age structure is related to economic growth and basically unless Japanese productivity rapidly increases to make up for this low birthrate the Japanese economy is going to continue to shrink no matter what the Japanese government does and I think it's very likely that Japanese productivity is going to go up dramatically and they go up a little with I mean they're trying to use a lot of robots to replace people and you can go quite a ways with that but you can't go all the way with that you do need young people to be working so the big question in my project is why is this happened in some regions of the post-industrial world and not others so as I said it's really in southern Europe Italy Spain Portugal Greece and in East all of East Asia and then also Germany Austria and a few other European countries and it's basically the issue of why fewer young people are forming stable partnerships either cohabiting heterosexual relationships or marriages so this delay of marriage and increasing rates of not marrying and that's happening particularly in Japan unprecedented numbers of young people just not if not getting married even by age forty or forty-five and a second piece of this is okay you got into a union and you don't have kids that's a little bit less of the reason in most countries so the reason tends to be more focused on waiting and waiting and waiting to get into a partnership and maybe you've waited so long that even if you want kids it's it's getting really hard to to have them and the third reason which is people get into a partnership have one kid and then they stop and they don't have more so they stop after having an only child so these three components these three kind of stages in the life cycle are are cumulative cumulative Li the reason why we end up with low fertility and they're really I would say three puzzles that demographers have been particularly focused on and one is that around 90% of young adults in every society say that they do want to have children but they're not having the number of children most people say that they want to and they may be just saying that because that's kind of the norm but most people are not having to and even in the very low fertility countries like Spain and Italy and Japan and Korea and so forth ninety ninety percent of young people whether they're in a partnership or not say yeah I want to have kids someday yeah I want to have two or three but it's not happening so there's one theory which I find no evidence for in my research so I'm not going to talk about it very much there's one theory by a Dutch demographer that this is all due to rising individualism and you know young people being selfish and not wanting families and so forth I I find no evidence of that whatsoever in my research now a second puzzle is that it's really kind of these societies that we've conventionally thought of as being very family oriented societies like Italy and Spain and Portugal and you know Japan cozy tight families in Korea that aren't having babies so that's kind of interesting so there was an Italian demographer who wrote an article in Daedalus several years ago which had the title too much family so I think it was about Italian sons and staying at home and so forth and then the third puzzle which is the what I'm going to talk about for a couple of minutes is that it's the countries now in the 21st century where women are too dissipating at the highest rate in the labor market that have the highest fertility okay so let me show you some more figures so in nineteen seventy I plotted and I'm this is not original with me this is um well known by demographers now but I think it's really interesting in nineteen seventy if we look at the total fertility rate which I've explained to you here for each of these countries and then this is the female labor force participation rate so this is the number of women adult women who are employed divided by the number of women in the population so this includes part-time work and full-time work and you see that the northern European countries had high female labor force participation even in 1970 the southern European countries were way down here 30% 35% of women participating in the economy but higher birth rates right and here's Japan now the correlation the zero-order correlation between the total fertility rate of a country and the labor force participation rate for women was negative and statistically significant so if we drew drew a regression line it would go like that so the countries that had the higher birth rates had fewer women in the economy which kind of makes sense right kind of a trade-off between having kids versus working 1980 we see basically the same thing Sweden Denmark and Finland chugging along with a lot of women in the labor force not very many babies being born you see southern you're up down here and there's Japan and then Korea's over here and so there's still a negative correlation and it's statistically significant okay now look what happened by 1990 now you see the Northern European countries women are participating at a high rate in the labor market and those countries have moved into the position of having the highest birth rates I mean not high birth rate spread around population replacement level okay there's southern Europe few babies few women in the labor force there's Japan and there's Korea and now the correlation has completely flipped it's a positive correlation and it's statistically significant so this is wonderful from a social science point of view we love it when something goes from being highly statistically significant as a negative direction and then it goes positive it's like well something is going on we get excited about that in 2000 we see the same thing so the same pattern okay so strong positive correlation statistically significant okay so I'll just show you the skeletal view of this I thought it might be a little bit easier to see if I take out the the numbers and the rates and so forth so just watch over 1972 2000 how this these different regions and countries move so they move like that so you end up with this regression line like this Northern Europe – male labor force participation high birth rates southern Europe very little of either in Japan and South Korea or more towards the southern European end so looking at the case of Japan because as Judy said I am a Japan specialist so Japan totally gets privileged in this talk but it is only one case and their research and tooth up until about 2005 the Japanese government wringing its hands over the low fertility problem since at least 1990 was really the the Liberal Democratic Party ruling party politicians we're really thinking that the answer was to you know maintain male breadwinner system women should quit the labor force when they get marry or have their first child which is the kind of canoe life course for Japanese women and then they would have more children so just keep making it possible for men to be the breadwinners and women to stay at home and have children to the point where there was a very famous quote in 2005 the health minister stated that the Japanese fertility crisis would be solved if the country's baby-making machines would stay at home and have more babies now this was not internationally very popular and it was very embarrassing for Japan and very embarrassing for the Liberal Democratic Party but the Liberal Democratic Party keeps getting elected anyway and now we have a new prime minister Prime Minister Abe a and but he's drunk the kool-aid he understands now what has to happen so he's reversed course from his party's previous position and he's going around the world in the last year or so saying women are the are the future of Japan and what Japanese women need to do they need to save the nation he's also very nationalistic used to be the rest of East Asia women need to save the Japanese nation by having two babies and working full time this will solve the fertility crisis and also you know they're going to be providing all this labor rather cheaply to the to the Japanese companies so now the Economist is really going to town with this and obvious giving them lots and lots of ammunition so this was two weeks ago March 29th holding back half the nation and this is very clever because of course that's the Japanese son that is shackling women so a week ago or so I found a very good video clip on this and we'll just watch a little bit of it okay so the media the media's liking of this kind of theme just kind of keeps going so USA Today which probably most of us don't read Japan looks for a few good women to revive economy IMF can women save Japan so this is my favorite this is actually from three years ago but this again shows that it's really woman's fault very sad story women are rejecting marriage and Asia so I think it's very I don't analyze discourse even though it sounds like I do but I think it's really fascinating that the focus is all on women Japanese women are the problem but I wanted to show that film clip in an extended way because they did start getting to what corporate culture is like and what working hours are like and what men's lives are like in Japan and Japanese women don't necessarily want to have men's lives and I think that's very rational actually but in any case what demographers and some politicians such as Shinzo Abe a have realized is is this fact that it's the economies and the countries who are making it possible for women to balance work and family where people are having families and women are participating in the workforce so is this a policy story were that it were that so easy Japan has much better child care policy and family leave policy than the United States which isn't saying very much because we basically have nothing but Japan has guaranteed paid child care leave its had it for almost 20 years it has publicly funded high quality daycare closes a 6:00 p.m. which I think sounds quite reasonable but as you saw that older Japanese woman or know the younger Japanese said what are you gonna do it closes at 6 p.m. well that's because you're still working at 6 p.m. which is part of the problem the long work hours in any case Japan has really good policies for supporting families they haven't done a bit of good Sweden has great policies we have again almost nothing and our birthrate is similar to Sweden so policy is part of the solution but there are a lot more aspects to the picture and because it's such a complicated problem that's why it keeps me studying it because this is a very complex set of issues that have caused people to kind of not have families so one of the things that entered the demographic literature about ten years ago was an increase increased emphasis on gender equality both in the workplace and at the home in the home so there's a well-known Australian demographer who doesn't do very much empirical work but he does a lot of theoretical work and he's written a series of articles basically saying that you know throughout the post-industrial world it's universal that women are getting more and more education are getting more and more you know accumulating more and more human capital and entering wanting to enter the workforce in greater numbers and in some societies that's become more and more possible it's certainly changed dramatically in the u.s. over the last 30 or 40 years and so there's a kind of gender revolution in terms of public roles even though it's not a complete gender revolution but within the home gender roles have been much stickier so men's contribution to childcare hours and domestic work has not anywhere near matched women's increased hours in the workplace although man's contribution has increased it's increased quite a lot in the United States and so McDonald brings attention to this kind of paradox that women are more and more qualified to take on public rolls and yet are doing kind of a double shift the old second shift that the sociologist Berkeley sociologist Arlie Hochschild talked about and so it becomes really hard to have two children really hard to have children and balance everything let alone one child two children three children and so the goals of my project which I'm just getting to so I wanted to have a kind of long lead up to explain you know the purposes of the project I'm trying to incorporate man more into the theoretical framework because you know if we're talking about women's roles and gender equality we need to talk about what men are doing as well and that hasn't been very much examined in the demographic or the media attention and also despite the fact that I keep talking about Japan and East Asia the demographic literature the scholarly literature is extremely focused on Europe because Italy and Spain and so forth are important cases and so European demographers there aren't very many who know very much about East Asia but they're getting more and more interested in East Asia because East Asia is having the same sorts of issues so you know it's a good kind of entre for me as an East Asian specialist to come into this literature and then as Judy said in her introduction I'm bringing qualitative methods into the analysis because demography is a very very quantitative sub discipline and the typical type of data that demographers use is survey data and doing statistical analysis of survey data and that takes us a certain ways but I feel that it's really important to hear what people are saying and thinking and believing about gender and about families and so forth also to hear what people are how people are responding to labor market institutions things like long work hours and so forth how they're dealing with that how they're thinking about it general economic conditions and also how people talk about what they gender role beliefs are so let me used to show you the statists um statistics on working hours since I've alluded to that and the video clip alluded to that so a good friend of mine who's a Japanese labor economist Nobuko nagase she has data on the working the time that married men and women in Japan in the u.s. leave work and this is the hour of the day so that's 6:00 p.m. so u.s. married women it's kind of a nice we would call it a normal distribution a lot of us married women leave work if they're working they leave work at 5 o'clock and actually this is pretty typical for Japanese not Japanese man u.s. married man 2 and my friend Nobuko the labor economist when she calculated this she thought she'd made an error in the in the data analysis she she said well married American men can't be leaving at 5 o'clock she's just thought that's too early but they do now more married American men stay later that's the red line than married American women but the lines are pretty similar so we get to Japan and that's the yellow line and you see this is single women so they're leaving later they're leaving on average about 6 o'clock and a lot of them are staying much later but that's midnight that's 9:00 that's 10:00 ok married women well they're leaving at 5 or 6 or 7 or 8 or 9 ten but it's Japanese men who are the outliers because they're leaving 8 or 9 or 10 or 11 or midnight no wonder they're not doing any household work so Japanese men unfortunately are always at the bottom of the table when you look at that number of hours of household labor provided by men across countries Japanese men always ranked the lowest they're not home they're not home so it has to do with corporate culture it has to do with the labor market institutions and it has to do with gender role norms it has to do with the male breadwinner system so I'm not going to talk about those two because I'll run out of time I'm using various methods but the one I'll talk about for the remaining time is what we've been doing this year my research partners and I which is to look at very in-depth structured interviews from the five countries and as I said at the beginning Sweden is separate because the Swedish team is analyzing the Swedish interviews and then they'll be here they're visiting from Stockholm University in May so these are other papers aggregate level papers so this is the qualitative research design so I came into the Radcliffe year with all the interviews done all of them transcribed and coded we quoted everything that we could from the interviews quantitatively but I'm not going to talk about that part but I designed the project so that we did we have 80 interviews in each of these five countries and the numbers in the circles are the again the fertility rate so Sweden in the US or the you know relatively high fertility cases and then Japan and Spain and South Korea are the low ones and we interviewed people so as to look at these stages forming partnership we're marrying moving to having a child moving to having a second child and the way that we chose the sample eighty sounds like a lot if your qualitative researcher or an ethnographer and that sounds like nothing if you're a quantitative person and so in order to make and you're never going to have a representative sample of anything if you have only 80 people and so in order to kind of make this small sample as meaningful as possible I controlled for education age half the sample as men have two samples female in each country they're all urban residents we only chose people in the majority ethnic group of each country because obviously for instance for the u.s. if you have hispanics and asians and african-americans and whites there's going to be so much variation you know within the u.s. sample that you can't say anything really about anybody everybody had to be heterosexual because we're interested in biological fertility and so we interviewed people young adults in their late 20s and early 30s eighty in each country and this is how we got the sample i have to go through this quickly but this is called a snowball sample so we had focal individuals who thought of two people who would fulfill the sampling frame the sampling criteria and then we interviewed those two people each of those persons was allowed to say well okay i know two more people hopefully not close friends but people that are a little more distant from them in the relationship who fulfill that criteria we interviewed them and a former colleague of mine at cornell showed mathematically if you go far enough out like this if if you kept going for many iterations you would approximate a random sample of the population because you're getting farther and farther out from the original focal person so this person you know doesn't know this person and if we go farther and farther out there again those people are going to have less less and less and common and the interview is long it has five sections the first section we ask people to describe their typical weekday so it's really kind of getting the texture of their everyday life and then typical evening to typical weekend day so if they're working and most people are although there's some women for instance in Korea or Japan who are on maternity leave they talk a lot about their job and this was meant to be just kind of a warm-up time for the interviewee to become comfortable but actually there's a lot of really good stuff in this part of the interview because we ask you know how does your employer evaluate you big thing in Japan is it used to be that you were supposed to stay at work until your boss left and so if you were in a Japanese office you know five or six or seven p.m. which was in the old days you you see everybody just sitting there and kind of you know shifting papers around and so forth and then the boss would leave and as soon as he got out of the building everybody would clear out and you were supposed to stay until he left that's less and less necessary now but we asked about that my Swedish collaborator thought I was crazy to have that question she's like well you leave when your works done you don't have to wait til the boss is you know leaving but it's a signal in Japan that you're serious about your work if you stay section 2 meaning of marriage Parenthood intentions to have children we asked about childcare and housework lot of questions about gender roles and gender norms and thoughts about policy the interviews I was going to have you listen to a snippet but there's there's not time they vary between about 50 minutes and two and a half hours Korean women are particularly unhappy and I have a lot to say so and the Spanish interviews tend to be shorter the American and the Japanese are in the Swedish are in between so here's an example here are just some examples and then I'll show you a few quick things that I can call preliminary findings but we have to focus on the preliminary part of that so in section 2 the interviewer says so you have one child correct so this is people who have who are in a partnership and have one child so do you want to have more children say in the next three to five years and I used that because people tend to be pretty accurate if you ask them do you ever want to have another child what they say may or may not be accurate but if you're asking them in a in the short run you get pretty accurate answers this is there's been a lot of study of this in the demographic literature so why are why not what are the conditions for your deciding to have a second child can you think of any obstacles and so what are they some questions from section 4 when children are age 3 are under a married woman should be a housewife and focus on child care would you tend to agree or disagree with this statement why and in section 4 I have a lot of statements like that that I took from a big survey the World Values Survey which asks people to respond to all these gender role questions but it's you know of course a closed-ended it's closed-ended questions and in the interview we say why do you feel that way so this is a big part of why I did the interviews because I want to know what people's reasoning is you you learn a lot about people as they explain what their reasoning is and sometimes it's internally contradictory you know when they're talking to you for an hour and a half and that's interesting too and then this is a very provocative question in some countries if your spouse wanted to be a househusband how would you feel about that most Japanese women do not feel good about this and then to men what would you think about becoming a househusband also my Swedish colleague thought this was crazy because it doesn't have the same valence in Sweden than it does in the United States because everybody works in Sweden so some guy who wanted to become a house husband would be regarded as a lazy bum whereas you know we think oh how liberal so most questions don't have that kind of cultural you know variance but we certainly you know talked about that a great deal when we were formulating the questionnaire so we have transcripts for everybody four hundred people so this is a New York City transcript one transcript page one of 46 pages but I can read it so that's good I'm a native English speaker so I can unlock what's in it this is a Japanese transcript and I'm fine with that too because I know Japanese and so I can listen I listen to these in my car on the way to Radcliffe I listen to the American or the Japanese interviews depends how hard I want to work I have to work a little harder if it's the Japanese but I listen and you know I didn't do the interviews but I hear the voices and I I after I listened to many of them I get a feeling a lot of feelings that you wouldn't get from a survey and then we have the transcripts so this is Spanish and I don't understand Spanish this is Korean and I don't understand Korean so this is why I have all the undergraduate research assistants to help me understand these I can explain in the Q&A why we're not translating all of these transcripts although it may be obvious because it's thousands of pages but we've played around with various ways of analyzing the data it's just a lot of qualitative data it's very rich and there are very few road maps in the literature for analyzing this kind of data so we have five different cultural contexts and five languages the Swedish interviews of course are in Swedish and we played around in the summer so pre Radcliff nelida Garcia was here today worked with me and analyzed are rather translated from the Spanish interviews answers to one question so in other words we excerpted out from the 80 spanish interviews certain questions and Nellie got translated that what the interviewer in the interview he said there are problems with that this is almost like a variable based approach it's like okay let's look at this little piece of what each of 80 people said and so we we actually put spend a lot of time with that but you don't get a picture of the individual the whole individual and the context in which they're expressing their opinion you know on this particular question so there's a tension between that kind of approach which has its own utility and the approach where you take a whole interview and you read through it and you think about it and you take notes but I can't do that with the Korean interviews and the Spanish interviews so my Spanish Ras and Korean Ras are listening to taking an interview listening to it reading the transcript taking notes and then writing for me and in depth mammal which is really a profile of the person and this has been I think particularly useful for me for Spain because Spain is the context I know the least well I know Japan very well us Korea I know fairly well although there was a few surprises but Spain I don't really have a feeling culturally for and so it's been really valuable for me to be able to read through these two-and-a-half three page single-spaced memos where someone is describing Magdalena or whoever and who this person is so this is an example of one of the Korean memos Teresa was here so Teresa I wrote a long memo about this woman so I'll just read a little bit of what Teresa summarized from why young who's a married woman with one child so this is the memo that Teresa produced and in the middle of the memo Teresa wrote her husband started out working for Samsung in Seoul he was transferred to Chun Hwan when the baby was five months old and he came back to Seoul when the baby was two years old so that's interesting separation of the two parents although they're not separated they're not you know divorced during this time the interviewee saw her husband once or twice a month and she lived with her mother-in-law who continues to live with them now the interviewees mother-in-law first moved in with the interviewee because they thought that would be better than both of them living alone while the husband was away in another city she was not worried about this at first because she and her mother-in-law had a good relationship the interviewee calls her mom instead of mother years of living together has however taken its toll on the relationship this is why Korean women tend to talk a lot one of the reasons another negative effect of her mother-in-law moving on was that her husband reverted to his bachelor lifestyle I hope there are no Korean man in the room he used to help around the house but now that his mom lives with them he spends all of his free time playing computer games the interviewee does not like this because he does not like to spend time with his family leaving their daughter to say I don't really like my dad so you know that might give hints about whether this guy was going to have another child or not but this is just really interesting and if we were just coding certain variables I would never know about this mother-in-law relationship and the fact that the husband was transferred to another city and the wife the young mother was left on her own and so forth so issues that we've just sum up very in a very preliminary way issues that we've particularly focused on this year are why there is so often a gap between the number of children people say they would like to have and the number of children they think they probably will have so there's this gal the aspirations are higher than what actually happens or what they think will be happening in the next several years there's very interesting stuff across the countries in terms of whether people think mothers and especially mothers of young children should be working outside of the household or not it's very interesting to listen to how people describe how their lives have changed since a baby was born the most extreme cases being some Japanese men who say their life hasn't changed since a baby was born or they say they feel like they have to stay at work later because the salary is so important now because they're supporting a family so it's like the male breadwinner model just like locks into place American men don't say that no American man said that although it's very difficult for American couples to do this balancing act at all so just some quick things there are lots and lots of findings that were working with American women in particular have this language of loving their jobs these are highly educated women so the whole sample is people who have high school education and some kind of higher education so community college or university across all the countries and American women have this there's this discourse of loving their work but these are highly educated women so it makes sense although they're not all in fantastically wonderful jobs great desire for flexible work hours the word balance comes up over and over again and the American interviews much more than in the other countries in this class the highly educated marriage comes before children in the United States hands down nobody is talking about cohabiting and having children so that's interesting too because I think there are huge social class differences in this and the it states Americans tend to describe marriage as being in a team people talk about having married their best friend and my Japanese colleague Nobuko found this really strange and she said after she she listened to one American interview just for fun and she said okay now I finally understand why Americans divorce so much and it was because you've got a whole lot riding on this emotionally working out she said a Japanese person would never say I married my best friend never but this is the lingo you know in New York City in Boston among young adults Spain economic and security economic and security economic and security extremely high youth unemployment rates men and women talk about this all the time we can't have a second child because neither of us has a secure job very high rates of cohabitation similar to Sweden getting similar to Sweden lots of people having children within cohabitation not seeing a reason to marry so Spain is turning out to be a fabulously interesting case because there's been so much value change over the last 20 years many Spanish women speak about work is symbolizing autonomy for themselves American women never say this American women in the generation I'm looking at it's like that came before and now it's all about balancing Japan and Korea marriage comes before children absolutely strong cultural emphasis on being a really really good mother very devoted mother which often means you don't work outside the home and together with corporate culture this makes it very difficult as we've seen for married women to work and to have children friction between mothers in law and daughters-in-law that mainly comes up in Korea not very often in Japan and in Japan and Korea especially Korea people talk all the time about the cost of education because Korea is really the most educationally frenetic society outside of where I live Lexington Massachusetts many of you heard me talk about this this year but Koreans talk all the time about how much it costs to raise a child and the main cost that they point to is education so I need another Radcliff here too you

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